Child rights jurisprudence without borders: Developments in extraterritorial jurisdiction

1 Introduction and overview

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the United National Committee on the Rights of the Child can be said to be pushing the boundaries of international law on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Two recent decisions of the Committee, issued under the 3rd Optional Protocol to the CRC on Communications Procedure (the Optional Protocol, OP3 or OPIC), are explored with a view to examining this question. The first case under the spotlight dealt with the question of whether children of foreign fighters experiencing rights violations in camps in North East Syria were within the jurisdiction of France for the purposes of determining liability under the Convention and OP3. The second case concerned a different transboundary jurisdiction question, namely, whether children whose rights are violated due to transboundary damage caused by carbon emissions are under the jurisdiction of the state of the origin of those emissions provided there is a sufficient causal link. The analysis to determine whether the Committee is “pushing the boundaries” operates on two pivots. The first is the extent to which jurisprudence from other treaty bodies and for a have been used within the decisions - an analysis of the “transboundariness” of jurisprudence. The second pivot of the analysis aims to answer the question as to whether the CRC Committee has “pushed the boundaries” of international law on extraterritorial jurisdiction. I examine the decisions, and various academic opinions relating to them, and I advance arguments in support of an affirmative answer to both of these questions.

It is now over a decade since OP3 was adopted by the UN General Assembly,1 and it came into operation on 14 April 2014, three months after the 10th state ratified it. Those who lobbied for and were involved in drafting the Optional Protocol saw the opportunity - indeed the obligation - to create a pathway to justice for children to seek remedies for their rights.2 But of course, it was not the first such mechanism - several other treaty bodies - notably the Committees for the ICCPR and CEDAW already\ had such optional protocols and had been receiving communications/complaints - including with regard to some children’s rights matters.3

At the regional level, there were already courts operating that were dealing with children’s rights, at least to a limited extent as provided for in the relevant instruments, notably the European Court of Human Rights,4 the Inter-American Court on Human Rights,5 and the African Court on Human Rights.6 OP3 did not come to life in a vacuum - it was born into an existing broader rights framework in which procedural and substantive jurisprudence had already been developed.

One angle of my analysis in this article explores the extent to which the Committee on the Rights of the Child has drawn from the jurisprudence of other treaty bodies, and to what extent it is charting its own course. Is the jurisprudence crossing the boundaries of particular treaties when it comes to children’s rights? This rather literal interpretative question is also suffused with a more figurative question - Has the Committee on the Rights of the Child been pushing the boundaries of accepted international human rights law? Another angle of my analysis takes a different interpretive route, relating to geographical boundaries. What steps has the Committee taken to stretch or redefine the territorial boundaries of the application of children’s rights?

In undertaking this analysis, I examine two sets of cases that were received under OP3 during 2019. The first set of cases comprises two similar cases that were joined together at the merits stage in LH v France (hereafter LH).7 The cases were brought by grandparents who sought the repatriation to France of their grandchildren who were living with their mothers in refugee camps in North east Syria. The other set of cases, Sacchi v Argentina and others (hereafter Sacchi),8 deal with climate change effects rising from carbon emissions. Both cases raised complex questions regarding transboundary jurisdiction.

2 LH and others v France

In LH, the petitioners9 explain the background of the case. The mothers of the children were among many French women who had fled the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and surrendered to the Kurdish Forces in North-East Syria. The women and children were then detained in the Hawl, Ayn Isa and Roj camps. In 2018 Kurdish authorities had indicated that they wanted all foreign nationals in the camps to be repatriated to the states of nationality, and initially, the French Authorities announced that they would repatriate 70 women and children from the camps, but then did a U-turn on this decision, without providing any explanation.10 In a similar vein, when the grandparents in the LH case, via their counsel, initially sent their request to receive their children back in France, they were assured that the children were entitled to protection and would be assisted, no action was taken, and further inquiries were met with silence.11

The dire conditions in the camps in North East Syria were described, presenting an imminent risk to children who were barely surviving in a context where 29 children had died of hypothermia the previous year, and where they faced ongoing risks from violence within the camps as well as the volatile conflict situation immediately beyond the camps.12 According to the petitioners, the state party had been made aware of the deplorable conditions in which the children were living, therefore the state party’s failure to take any positive action resulted in the violations of several rights in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, namely the right to non-discrimination;13 the right to have their best interests considered as a primary consideration;14 the right to life, survival and development;15 the right not to be deprived of a family environment;16 the right to medical treatment;17 and right not to be treated in a cruel, inhuman and degrading manner.18

Essentially, the cases sought the repatriation of the children back to France. Due to their complexity, the admissibility of the cases was dealt with separately from the merits.19 At the admissibility stage, the central issue that the Committee had to deal with was a counter-argument by France that the children were not within the jurisdiction of France, and that the cases were therefore inadmissible. Article 2 of the CRC says that the Convention applies to all children “within the jurisdiction” of the state - but it does not say “within the territory”.

The Committee received two Third-Party Interventions in this matter.20 One of these was submitted by a group of 31 academics.21 The academics noted that extraterritorial obligations are similar to situations where multiple states share concurrent jurisdiction over a certain territory.22 Therefore, even if the state party has no effective control in the area, it still has a positive obligation to “take all appropriate measures and to pursue all legal and diplomatic avenues, at its disposal to protect the rights of the children.”23 Another interesting argument made by the group of 31 academics was on the drafting history of article 2 of the CRC. The academics pointed out that extraterritorial jurisdiction was not excluded from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but that in the travaux préparatoire (preparatory work) it was expressly indicated that territoriality was excluded from the Convention.24

Moreover, the group of 31 academics point out that an early draft of article 2(1) of the CRC showed that the applicability of the CRC was originally linked to the jurisdiction and the territory of a state. However, the word “territory” was intentionally left out of the final text of article 2, which is why the final version only reflects the concept of jurisdiction. According to the 31 academics, this is indicative that the drafting parties of the Convention did not intend the concept of jurisdiction to be exclusively territorial.25 A particularly pertinent part of the 31 academics’ argument pointed to the concurring opinion on Al Skeini v United Kingdom, 26 by Judge Bonello which noted that “jurisdiction arises from the mere fact of having assumed [human rights] obligations and from having the capability to fulfil them (or not to fulfil them)”. 27 As will be seen later in this article, this mention of “capability” was picked up by the CRC Committee and included in its findings on the merits.

In international human rights law, it is commonly recognised that the jurisdiction of states is primarily territorial.28 However, case law has developed the recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction in certain circumstances, although these mostly refer to situations where the state exercises effective control of an area abroad (the European Court of Human Rights judgments in Bankovic v Belgium (2001), 29 and Ilascu v Moldova and Russia (2004), 30 and Catan v Moldova and Russia (2012), 31 being determinative on this issue. The European Court of Human Rights also carved out an exception where the state exercises control over individuals in the cases of Pad v Turkey (2007), 32 and Al Skeini v UK (2011). 33

The problem in the LH case, though, was that France does not exercise control over the territory in North East Syria which is currently controlled by the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.34 The CRC Committee considered the jurisprudence of the European Court, and also made mention of the General Comment of the Human Rights Committee on the right to life.35Ultimately however, the Committee crossed new boundaries in its extraterritorial jurisprudence by finding, on the basis of specific factors such as the children’s vulnerability, the deplorable conditions, the fact that effective control was held by a non-state actor that had said it had neither the means nor the will to look after the children in the camps and expected the detainees’ countries of nationality to repatriate them. In these circumstances, the committee found that

the State party, as the State of the children’s nationality, has the capability and the power to protect the rights of the children in question by taking action to repatriate them or provide other consular responses. These circumstances include the State party’s rapport with the Kurdish authorities, the latter’s willingness to cooperate and the fact that the State party has already repatriated at least 17 French children from the camps in Syrian Kurdistan since March 2019.36

The decision is not without its critics. Marko Milanovic has criticised the Committee for basing its decision, in part, on nationality.37 He acknowledges that the Committee did so in such a manner that nationality is not the sole ground for the Committee’s finding.38 However, he argues that nationality was a “but for” condition in the reasoning of the Committee, in that if the children were not French nationals, France would not have had the duty to repatriate them.39 He lists three reasons why relying on nationality as the basis for France’s responsibility towards the children is problematic: first, is the fact that nationality is generally acquired through birth, making it a poor foundation on which to base a state’s responsibility towards its citizens. Second, the premise that the children’s French nationality can help them is false. This is because France could have also repatriated children who were not French nationals since they were no rules from the Kurdish authorities to oppose this. Third, the fact that nationality is being used to solve a problem which is universal in nature and finally because state laws on the acquisition and deprivation of nationality vary greatly.

He notes that it is unclear what test is being relied on by the Committee, but that it is not one of control over the camps. He points to the fact that the Committee makes is clear that nationality cannot be solely relied upon to trigger jurisdiction under article 2(1) of the CRC. Milanovic argues that the Committee has adopted a “functional” approach which is based on the rationale that France has a duty to repatriate the children because it has the ability to do so.40 He expresses concern about the perverse risk of the Committee’s reliance on the fact that France had demonstrated its ability through the fact that it had brought certain children home. He poses the question - if it had not done so, would that have worked in its favour? He acknowledges that the benefit of relying on the functional approach to extraterritoriality is that states would owe a duty of protection to citizens when they are factually capable of providing such protection. However, he reasons that the problem with the functional approach is that unless the capability inquiry is very strictly applied, it will become unreasonably burdensome for states.41

Milanovic expresses support for the decision to return to the children, he is simply unimpressed with the legal rationale. However, as he himself acknowledges, the Committee does not rely on nationality as a criterion - it is merely one of several facts that, provide the basis for the obligation. Citizenship was relevant because it creates the link between the state and the children, otherwise, the obligation would indeed become unreasonably onerous for states. It was also relevant because the French had a relationship with the Kurdish authorities and was therefore able to organise for the repatriation, as it had previously done - and this was a relevant fact for the capability approach.

Helen Duffy, writing for the Children’s Rights Observatory,42 expresses disappointment that the Committee tied its decision so closely to the facts and therefore avoided creating a more replicable set of principles. Duffy argues that although facts and context inform the approach to interpretation, they should not replace the basic standard that the Committee used to determine that France had jurisdiction in the matter. She adds that an understanding of the Committee’s reasoning in coming to the conclusion that France had jurisdiction over the French children in the Kurdish-controlled camps “could have helped locate this case within the trends and developments around jurisdiction, and increased the influence of the Committee’s jurisprudence on international legal development”.43

Nevertheless, the critics consider the developments to be bold, and, one might conclude: pushing the boundaries. As Duffy observes:

Nonetheless one can foresee that the ‘circumstances’ identified by the Committee, and its approach, may be referenced in support of jurisdiction in other cases and contexts. They are certainly not exclusive, or required tests, and should not be taken as such. But they offer another perspective on the issue, drawing on some interesting - and some controversial - elements, and opening up a number of questions for further consideration.44

Duffy describes the Committee’s approach as flexible, fact-specific and holistic. On flexibility and fact specificity, she submits that the Committee focuses on the “imminence”, “urgency” and “vulnerability” of the case and this shows the factual aspects of the case which are relevant to the Committee’s decision.45 On the holistic aspect, she notes that the decision suggests the need to move from formal and rigid distinctions, as the Committee has done by rejecting the requirement of personal or physical control to determine jurisdiction and accepting sufficient, factual and legal factors to establish a nexus between individuals outside their countries and the state.46

In a subsequent judgment on the merits,47 the Committee found that France’s argument that it did not have the capability to repatriate the children, because it would depend on the consent of the Kurdish authorities did not hold water, because France had previously managed to repatriate 30 children, and because the Kurdish authorities had indicated a general willingness to allow such repatriations. The Committee also found that France had an obligation to adopt positive measures - which was particularly strong given the conditions in the camps and the imminent risk of death facing the children.48

The Committee found that France’s failure to protect the children had violated their rights to have their best interests considered as a primary consideration (art 3) and not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (art 37(a)). The Committee also found that the state’s failure to protect the children from an imminent and foreseeable threat to their lives constituted a violation of their right to life in terms of article 6(1) of the Convention.49

Reporting to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its 5th and 6th Reports under the Convention during the 93rd session in May 2023, France recorded that it has repatriated 144 children from camps in Syria.50 Most of these children were repatriated after the decision in the FB v France decision.

An interesting postscript to all this is the recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of HF v France,51 handed down after the CRC Committee decisions. The Court found firstly that France cannot be held responsible for the inhumane conditions in the camps, and secondly that there is no general right to repatriation. 52 The court found France responsible only for a procedural violation of the rights of the children to “enter their own country”. 53 It is a disappointing decision but for the purposes of this article, it contains several paragraphs in which the ECtHR cites the views of the CRC Committee:

In paragraph 269, the court relies on the Committee’s decision to that there are exceptional circumstances which trigger an obligation to ensure that the decision-making process in the was case was surrounded by appropriate safeguards against arbitrariness. 54

269 ... the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has, for its part, stated that France must assume responsibility for the protection of the French children there and that its refusal to repatriate them entails a breach of the right to life and the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment (see paragraphs 106 and 107 above). In its decision of 8 February 2022 the Committee emphasised that it was important for France to ensure that the best interests of the child, as guaranteed by Article 3 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, was a primary consideration in examining requests for repatriation.

Again, this presents a new frontier - the European Court of Human Rights, for the first time, citing the jurisprudence of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. This is a positive development for the harmonisation of approaches.

To sum up with regard to the LH case, there is evidence that the CRC Committee has drawn from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and from the UN Human Rights Committee, but it is also clear that the CRC Committee is charting its own unique course. Interestingly, the Committee’s jurisprudence has been cited by the European Court of Human Rights, demonstrating that the jurisprudence is crossing the boundaries of different treaties. The critiques of the case also demonstrate that the decision has pushed the boundaries of accepted international human rights law, and at least some of the criticisms view this as a positive advancement. In the next part of the article, I turn to the other group of cases that I intend to analyse.

3 Chiara Sacchi et al v Argentina

The purpose of this section of the article is to advance the analysis of another important case received by the UN Committee on the rights of the child, in order to answer the central research questions posed in the introduction to this article. The issue of territorial jurisdiction was also pivotal in the decision by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in Chiara Sacchi et al v Argentina et al.55 Sixteen children brought this case to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, claiming violations of their rights by five state parties: Argentina, France, Brazil, Germany and Turkey. According to the petitioners the five countries had violated their rights in the CRC by causing and perpetuating the climate crisis, which had caused ongoing violations of the children petitioners’ rights (right to life, right to health and right to culture).56 The central issue in this case was the question of jurisdiction, in that most of the petitioners were not nationals or residents of the state parties against which the complaint was brought.57 The case was ultimately held to be inadmissible due to failure to exhaust domestic remedies but the committee made certain findings in relation to jurisdiction.

4 The CRC Committee’s findings

The Committee observed that under article 2 of the CRC, states have the obligation to respect and ensure the rights of “each child within their jurisdiction” but that that “territory” is not mentioned in that article.71 From here on the Committee took a different approach to jurisdiction from the previous case, because the nature of jurisdiction and transboundary harms is very specific in climate change cases. It should be noted that in this context, the Committee was discussing whether country A could be held liable for acts and omissions that occurred in country A but the effects of which travelled to country B and harmed children there.

The Committee relied on the Advisory Option OC-23/17 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the environment and human rights, to find that the exercise of jurisdiction arises from the state’s effective control over the conduct that causes environmental harm. The Committee also noted jurisprudence about jurisdiction coming from the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights but indicated that the facts and circumstances in those cases did not deal with the environment, whereas the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court did.72

So, relying on that Inter-American court advisory opinion, the Committee noted that in case of transboundary harm, jurisdiction is based on the understanding that it is the state within whose territory the harm originates that has effective control and is in a position to prevent the harm from occurring and causing effects to people outside its territory. 73 On the issue of “effective control” the Committee found that as the states have the ability to regulate activities that are the source of the harm-causing emissions and to enforce such regulations, they do have “effective control” over carbon emissions. 74

With regard to arguments by the respondent states that the climate harms could not be attributed to them because many states have contributed to such harms, the Committee found, in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the Paris Agreement that “the collective nature of the causation of climate change does not absolve the State party of its individual responsibility that may derive from the harm that the emissions originating within its territory may cause”.75

The Committee then explored the issue of causation, again drawing from the Inter-American Court’s advisory opinion.76 The Committee made the link between the state of origin and the transboundary harm: there must be a causal link between the acts or omissions of the state, and the negative impact on the rights of the children outside its territory.77 Furthermore, this harm should have been reasonably foreseeable to the state at the time of its acts or omissions. With regard to this point, the petitioners had argued that the states against which the communication was brought are well aware of the harmful effects of their internal and cross-border contributions to climate change - as is evident from signatures of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and later, its Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Paris Agreement.78 In setting out the test, the Committee indicated that the “required elements to establish [the] responsibility of the state are a matter of merits” and that the potential harm of the state party’s conduct must be reasonably foreseeable at the time of its acts or omissions, even for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction.79 The Committee found that petitioners’ arguments regarding harm were uncontested by the state parties, and that the states have known about the harmful effects of their contributions. 80 Taking into account the fact that the states had signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, as well as the “existing science” of the cumulative effects of carbon emissions, 81 the Committee found that the potential harms of their acts and omissions were reasonably foreseeable by the respondent states. 82

The Committee noted that it is not every harm that will result in a finding of jurisdiction, the grounds need to justify on the circumstances of the case and harm should be “significant”. The Committee went on to follow the line of reasoning by the Inter-American Court in its advisory opinion (which in turn was based on an interpretation by the International Law Commission on the prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities), that “significant” should be understood as more than “detectable” but need not reach the level of “serious” or “substantial”.83 The committee also linked this to whether the petitioners had established that they were victims of transboundary harm. It concluded that the petitioners had established “prima facie” that they had personally experienced real and significant harm, and this was sufficient to establish their victim status. 84 The Committee found that the petitioners “as children” are particularly affected by climate change both in terms of the way they experience it and its potential to have life-long impacts on them. 85 Invoking the recognition in the preamble to the CRC that children are entitled to special safeguards, including appropriate legal protection, the Committee concluded that states “have heightened obligations to protect children from foreseeable harm”. 86

The Committee’s development of jurisdiction in relation to climate harms has been described as breaking new ground in a manner “that is replicable and scalable”87 and that it opens the door to future litigation by children.88 The Committee’s reliance on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights advisory opinion and the way that this was used to expand the understanding of effective control towards a causality-based test in the context of environmental issues has mostly,89 been received positively, and described by Tigre and Lichet as “judicial cross-fertilization” which may impact similar claims worldwide, “providing a framework for national courts to use the CRC’s approach and causal nexus test to protect children’s rights”.90

What is unique about this case is that, it is the first to bring a complaint against multiple states parties to an international human rights body, from different regions of the world, at the same time, it is also the first climate case before an international body by people from different regions of the world.

The Committee’s decision in Sacchi has received both positive91 and negative responses.92 On the positive side, the case has been hailed as “ground-breaking”93 and “historic”94 due to the Committee’s reasoning on jurisdiction and victim status. Most importantly, the Committee has not only expanded on jurisdiction to include state parties’ extraterritorial obligations in the climate crisis, but has also set a precedent for similar cases where the question of jurisdiction and admissibility arise. The Committee has clearly stated that persons whose rights have been violated due to transboundary damage are under the jurisdiction of the state of origin provided there is “a causal link between the act that originated in its territory and the infringement of the human rights of persons outside its territory.” 95

Wewerinke-Singh submits that the replicability of the Committee’s finding “is hugely significant, as the issue of extraterritoriality needs to be confronted head-on to grapple with the global justice dimension of climate change - a dimension that remains under-addressed in rights-based climate litigation.”96 However, she notes that the Committee’s views remain confined to admissibility and await the views of the Committee on foreseeability and causation in the context of a future case that may successfully pass the threshold of admissibility and be decided on the merits.

In summary, the Sacchi case demonstrates that the Committee considered the jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee on extraterritorial jurisdiction, but did not find it applicable to the context of climate change, where the carbon emissions are being generated within the jurisdiction of the respondent states parties, although the children were living in other jurisdictions. The committee relied on the advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court, which dealt with environmental harms and was thus more applicable. The decision shows that the Committee is searching beyond the treaty body system for guidance to develop its jurisprudence. With regard to pushing the boundaries of international law on extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Committee was the first UN body to apply the approach adopted by the Inter-American Court - although it is interesting to note that a relevant aspect of that advisory opinion also rested on draft articles of the International Law Commission, which provided a basis for the idea that “significant” harm should be understood as something more than “detectable” but need not be at the level of “serious” or “substantial”.97 This draft article was used by the CRC Committee in determining that the children have demonstrated sufficient harm for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction.98

5 Conclusion

To conclude, I consider whether I have provided answers to the questions that I set out at the beginning: Is the jurisprudence crossing the boundaries of particular treaties and treaty bodies when it comes to children’s rights? And has as the Committee on the Rights of the Child been pushing the boundaries of accepted international human rights law? In my view, both questions can be answered in the affirmative. Of course, there are ongoing critiques - and indeed, that is what we, in the academy strive for - to keep legal discourse on these important contemporary legal issues in children’s rights alive.

On the first question of whether treaty bodies are using each other’s jurisprudence, and that of other supranational courts and bodies, I have presented several examples that prove that this is occurring. In the LH case, the Committee consulted and acknowledged the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in the series of judgments dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction Bankovic v Belgium,99 and Ilascu v Moldova and Russia,100 and Catan v Moldova and Russia,101 Pad v Turkey,102 and Al Skeini v UK.103 The Committee also made reference to the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the right to life.104 Ultimately, however, the Committee on the Rights of the Child went a step further added the concepts of “power and capability” to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The word “capability” had previously been used in a concurring judgment written by Justice Bonello in Al Skeini.105 If the Committee had followed a strict and formalistic view of jurisdiction, it would not have been possible to arrive at the conclusion that France had jurisdiction over the children in the Kurdish-controlled camps. Instead, the Committee’s view reflects a functional approach that rests on the power and capability of the state party to repatriate the French children.106 This exhibits a flexible approach where a holistic understanding of the specific facts, coupled with the required normative links brought the Committee to the conclusion that the state in the particular situation had sufficient effective control over the rights of individuals.107

It is reasonable to conclude then, that the LH case demonstrates that the Committee on the Rights of the Child pushed the boundaries in respect of both questions that I posed at the outset. The decisions in these cases clearly do rely on the jurisprudence of other treaty bodies and supranational courts, but also go further than them. The article also showed an interesting development that the European Court of Human Rights has already cited this decision in HF v France.108

In Sacchi, the Committee relied pivotally on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights where the Inter-American Court had laid the test for determining jurisdiction.109 Based on the Inter- American case, (Advisory Opinion OC-26) the Committee held that persons whose rights have been violated due to transboundary damage are under the jurisdiction of the state of origin, subject to their being a causal link between the act within its territory and the infringement rights of persons outside its territory.110 On the issue of “effective control” the Committee found that as the states have the ability to regulate activities that cause climate harms, and to enforce such regulations, they do have “effective control” over carbon emissions.111

With regard to the issue of causation, again drawing from the Inter-American Court’s advisory opinion, the Committee made the link between the State of origin and the transboundary harm: there must be a causal link between the acts or omissions of the state, and the negative impact on the rights of the children outside its territory. Furthermore, this harm should have been reasonably foreseeable. Finally, the Committee followed the approach of the Inter-American Court in its advisory opinion (which in turn was based on an interpretation by the International Law Commission on the prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities), that “significant” should be understood as more than “detectable” but need not reach the level of “serious” or “substantial”.

The Committee’s views in Sacchi have expanded the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Committee’s view in Sacchi has been described as “replicable” and “scalable”, and it is possible, therefore that other bodies, both domestic and international, may well rely on this jurisprudence in future matters.112

In respect of the Sacchi matter, I also assert that the Committee’s views can be said to be pushing the boundaries, both in terms of their use of jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and in the impact of its decision on extraterritorial jurisdiction.